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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
The decision in the instant case is in line with the weight of authority"
and is just both from the standpoint of reason and practicability.
M. B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS-RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE'-
FAIR TRADE ACTs-[United States]-In two recent decisions, hailed as a
Magna Charta for producers of trade-marked merchandise, 2 the Supreme
Court of the United States has sustained the validity of the Fair Trade
Acts of Illinois3 and California.4 In each of these cases suit was brought
under state Fair Trade Acts which authorize the producer of trade-marked
commodities which are in fair and open competition with commodities of
the same general class produced by others, to provide in the sales con-
tract that the buyer will not resell such commodity except at the price
stipulated by the producer, and that the buyer will require a similar con-
tract from his vendee. The acts further provide that the wilful and know-
ing selling of any such commodity at less than the price stipulated in such
contract, on the part of any party covered by it, is unfair competition and
is actionable by any person damaged, regardless of whether or not the per-
ton who cut prices is a party to the contract.5 The acts apply only to
vertical agreements, that is, as between persons in successive marketing
stages.6
The appellants were retail dealers who had cut prices in violation of
resale agreements between appellees, the wholesale dealers in certain trade-
marked commodities, and certain distributors from whom they had bought.
Diamond Service Station v. Broadway Motor Co., 158 Tenn, 258, 12 S. W.
(2d) 705 (1929); Twin City Motor Co. v. Rouzer Motor Co., 197 N. C. 371,
148 S. E. 461 (1929) ; Spritzer v. Rutgers Chevrolet Co., 12 N. J. Misc. 782,
174 Atl. 881 (1934).
10. Bozeman Mortuary Asso. v. Fairchild, 253 Ky. 74, 68 S. IV. (2d) 756,
92 A. L. R. 419 (1934); Contra, Atlas Insurance Co. v. Gibbs, 121 Conn.
188, 183 A. 690 (1936).
11. 2 Berry, Law of Automobiles (6th ed. 1929) sec. 1806.
1. For a definition of the term, "resale price maintenance" see Note, 49
Harv. L. Rev. 811 f.n. 1 (1936).
2. Pub. W. 130: 2281, 2283, 2296 (Dec. 12, 1936). Business Week, page
13-14 (Dec. 12, 1936).
3. Old Dearborn Distributing Company v. Seagram-Distillers Coropora-
tion, 57 S. Ct. 139 (Dec. 7, 1936).
4. Pep Boys, Manny, Moe and Jack of California v. Pyroil Sales Com-
pany, Inc., 57 S. Ct. 147 (Dec. 7, 1936).
5. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat., 1935, c. 121/2, sec. 188 et seq.; Illinois State
Bar Stat., 1935, c. 140, sec. 8 et seq. The California statute is substantially
the same: Cal. Stat. 1931, p. 583; Deering's Gen. Laws of California, 1931,
vol. 3, Act 8782.
6. "This Act shall not apply to any contract or agreement between pro-
ducers or between wholesalers or betwen retailers as to sale or resale
prices." Supra, note 5, see. 3. This section forbids the applictaion of the
act to "horizontal" price-fixing agreements. See also Fowle v. Park, 131
U. S. 88, 9 S. Ct. 658, 33 L. ed. 67 (1889); Park & Sons Co. v. National
Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, 175 N. Y. 1, 67 N. E. 136 (1903).
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The retailers challenged the validity of the Fair Trade Acts on the ground
that the right to sell for any desired price is inherent in the ownership of
a commodity, and hence the acts, by authorizing a regulation of prices as
against those not in privity of contract, were in violation of the due process
of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7. In answering this objection
the court drew a distinction between ownership of the goodwill which makes
a commodity saleable and the property right in the commodity itself. The
court pointed out that under the acts, if the owner of the commodity re-
moves the name and hence separates the goodwill of the producer from the
commodity itself, he may sell the commodity at any price he pleases.8
Nearly twenty years ago a New Jersey court in the case of Ingersoll
and Br . v. Hahne and Company9 sustained a statute which made it unlaw-
ful for any merchant to cut prices on a trade-marked product where the
goods carried a notice prohibiting such practice. In Dr. Miles Medical
Company v. Park and Sons Companyo the Supreme Court of the United
States held that price maintenance contracts similar to those involved in
the instant cases were invalid in so far as they affected goods in interstate
commerce because they were in violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act.10a
Although the court in that case clearly indicated that such agreements
might be legalized by an act of the legislature" the question of the liability
of a non-contracting party for price cutting was involved. The holding in
that case has been followed with slight modifications,12 not only by later
federal decisions but also by states which have anti-trust legislation.13 In
the absence of prohibitory legislation the state courts have generally held
that resale price agreements are valid, but these holdings have not been
extended so as to affect non-contracting parties.1 4
7. Appellants relied on Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 71
L. ed. 718 (1926); Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522, 67 L. ed.
1103 (1922); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 72 L. ed. 913 (1927);
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235, 73 L. ed. 287 (1928); New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 76 L. ed. 747 (1931). The court,
however, distinguished these cases from the instant cases, holding that they
"deal only with legislative price fixing;" and "constitute no authority for
holding that prices in respect to 'identified' goods may not be fixed under
legislative leave by contract between the patries." Supra, note 3.
8. Supra, note 3.
9. Ingersoll and Bro. v. Hahne and Company, 89 N. J. Eq. 332, 108 Atl.
128 (1918).
10. 220 U. S. 373, 31 S. Ct. 376, 55 L. ed. 502 (1911).
10a. 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. see. 1 (1890).
11. Supra, note 10, 1. c. 405: "Nor can the manufacturer by rule and
notice, in the absence of contract or statutory right, even though the re-
striction be known to purchasers, fix prices for future sales."
12. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300, 39 S. Ct. 465, 63 L. ed.
993, 7 A. L. R. 443 (1919). United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U. S.
476, 47 S. Ct. 192, 71 L. ed. 362 (1926).
13. Note, 30 Ill. Law Rev. 640 (1936); Note, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1. c. 813,
footnotes 7 to 15. For a case holding a resale contract unlawful in Missouri
see: Katz Drug Co. v. Sheaffer Pen Co., 6 F. Supp. 212 (D. C. IV. D. Mo..
1933) aff'd. 72 F. (2d) 548 (C. C. A. 8, 1934).
14. Note, 30 Ill. Law Rev. 640 (1936).
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Since the decision in the Miles case several fair trade bills have been
unsuccessfully introduced in Congress, 15 but the Tydings Fair Trade Act,
which aims at overcoming the decision of the Miles case as to goods in
interstate commerce, recently passed the Senate, and in view of the decision
in the instant cases will probably receive favorable action by the House in
the present session.' 6 A number of states have enacted Fair Trade Acts
which extend to parties not in privity of contract. 7 Although similar bills
were introduced in Missouri and Oklahoma, they were unsuccessful.' 8
It has been suggested that the validity of the acts should be upheld as
merely applying the doctrine of equitable servitudes to chattels, 9 but this
view has been criticized as insufficient on the ground that it begs the ques-
tion, since there is basically no difference between price fixing by the parties
with legislative authorization, as in the principal cases, and price fixing
which lacks express permission.20 Again, it has been proposed that properly
to sustain the fair trade acts resort must be had to the broadened concept of
due process announced in Nebbia v. New York,21 which extended the estab-
lished "public interest" test for price fixing by stating that there is no closed
category of business affected with a public interest.2" In that case, the
Supreme Court of the United States sustained a statute which provided
for the establishment of minimum retail milk prices. However, the New
York Court of Appeals in Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. Macy & Co.23 recently
declared the New York Trade Act invalid, stating that books are not af-
fected with a public interest so as to come within the class of commodities
which may be subjected to price-fixing. The court in that case regarded the
act as providing for direct legislative price-fixing. Thus it appears that
the implications from the Nebbia case taken alone are not sufficient to
sustain the acts.
As to the desirability of price maintenance from an economic standpoint
there is considerable disagreement. On the one hand it is contended that
15. 171 Printer's Ink (June 27, 1935) page 7.
16. Business Week (Dec. 12, 1936) page 13.
17. Besides the California and Illinois Statutes, supra, note 5, the follow-
ing states have passed Fair Trade Bills: Iowa, Acts 1935, c. 106; Maryland,
Laws 1935, c. 212; New Jersey, Acts 1935, c. 58; New York, Laws 1935,
c. 976; Oregon, Laws 1935, c. 295; Pennsylvania, Acts 1935, No. 115; Wash-
ington, Sess. Laws 1935, c. 177; Wisconsin, Session Laws 1935, Ass. Bill 343.
Arizona, Ohio, Louisiana, and Rhode Island have also recently passed simi-
lar acts. Business Week (Dec. 12, 1936) page 13.
18. 171 Printer's Ink (June 27, 1935) 1. c. 87.
19. Note, 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 267 (1936). The leading case on the
doctrine of equitable servitudes is Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep.
1143 (1848). See also Chaffee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels (1928) 41
Harv. L. Rev. 945.
20. Note, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1. c. 817 (1936).
21. 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934); see Note, 19 ST. Louis LAW
REviEw 202 (1934). See also Notes and Comments, 34 Col. L. Rev. 401
(1934); 47 Harv. L. Rev. 130 (1934); 32 Mich. L. Rev. 382 (1934).
22. This suggestion is made in a Comment, 5 Brooklyn Law Rev. 211
(1936). It is again suggested in a Note, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1. c. 817 (1936).
23. 269 N. Y. 272 (1936).
J!);1,71
Washington University Open Scholarship
274 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22
such agreements tend toward monopoly and higher prices.24 On the other
hand it is argued that the protection given to the owner of the trade-mark
extends to the retailer and ultimate consumer because of the elimination of
uneconomic practices, such as the sale of "loss leaders" results in lower
prices in general.25
o. R. A.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COmmERCE-TRADE REGULATION-
CO MIIODITIEs EXCHANGE AcT-[Federal].-In 1922 Congress passed the
Grain Futures Act' providing for the regulation of trading in grain futures
(sales for future delivery) in interstate commerce. In 1936 it passed the
Commodities Exchange Act2 amending the Grain Futures Act by extend-
ing it to transactions in various commodities other than grain.
In two recent cases, plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of
the latter act on the ground that it was a regulation of intrastate com-
merce and hence not within the power of Congress. In one case the in-
junction was refused, in the other the bill was dismissed for want of
equity.3
The judicial interpretation of that clause of the Federal Constitution
granting to Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several
states has had a kaleidoscopic history. Definition of the concept of inter-
state commerce has always been a perplexing problem to the courts. As to
what is commerce, the earliest cases gave a broad definition, calling it not
only "traffic," but the whole of commercial intercourse.4 In subsequent
cases this concept shrank to one of transportation, covering generally what-
ever was transported, by whatever means.5
Public opinion, aroused at attempted monopolies, and changes in its mem-
bership 6 caused the Supreme Court to expand the definition again, this time
24. Note, 30 Ill. Law Rev. 1. c. 645 (1936); see also, Goldsmith and
Winks, Price Fixing: Nebbia to Guffey (1936) 31 Ill. L. Rev. 179.
25. The Illinois act reads: "An Act to protect trade mark owners, dis-
tributors and the public against injurious and uneconomic practices in the
distribution of articles of standard quality under a trade-mark, brand or
name." Supra, note 5. Note, 30 Ill. L. Rev. 1. c. 646; Pub. W. 130: 2281,
2283, 2296, (Dec. 12, 1936); Business Week, page 13-14 (Dec. 12, 1936);
171 Printer's Ink (June 27, 1935) 7.
1. 42 Stat. 998, 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 3 (1922).
2. 49 Stat.-, U. S. C. A. Aug. 1936 Supp. 92 (1936).
3. Board of Trade of Kansas City v. Milligan, 4 U. S. Law Week 65(D. C. W. D. Mo., 1936); Moore v. Chicago Merc. Exchange, 4 U. S. Law
Week 35 (D. C. N. D. Ill., 1936).
4. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. (9 Wh., 6 Curt.) 1, 189, 6 L. ed. 1 (1824).
5. Phila. & Reading R. R. Co. v. Penna., 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 232, 21 L.
ed. 146 (1873); U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 1, 15 S. Ct. 249, 39 L. ed.
325 (1895).
6. Four new appointments were made between 1895 and 1905, while Mr.
Justice Harlan, who had dissented in the Knight case, remained on the
bench.
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